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Abstract—In his book, Capital in the 21st Century,
Thomas Piketty highlights the risk of an explosion of
wealth inequality because capital is accumulating faster
than income in several countries including the US and
European countries such as France. Our work challenges
the conclusions of the author in three steps.
First, the author’s result is based on the rise of only
one of the components of capital, namely housing capital,
and due to housing prices. In fact, housing prices have
risen faster than rent and income in many countries.
It is worth noting that “productive” capital, excluding
housing, has only risen weakly relative to income over the
last few decades. Over the longer run, the “productive”
capital/income ratio has not increased at all.
Second, rent, not housing prices, should matter for the
dynamics of wealth inequality, because rent represents
both the actual income of housing capital for landlords
and the dwelling costs saved by “owner-occupiers” (people
living in their own houses). Logically, to properly measure
capital, the value of housing capital must be corrected by
measuring it on actual rental price, and not housing prices.
Third, when we apply this change, we find that the
capital/income ratio is actually stable or only mildly higher
in the countries analyzed (France, the US, the UK, and
Canada) except for Germany where it rose.
These conclusions are exactly opposite to those found by
The first and third authors are PhD candidates in economics at
Sciences Po. The second and fourth authors are researchers at LIEPP
(Laboratory for Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policies), Sci-
ences Po. The fourth author is a professor of economics at Sciences-
Po. This work is based on a discussion by Etienne Wasmer on Capital
in the 21st Century at Sciences Po held on Dec. 12, 2013 at a public
debate organized by the MaxPo center with Thomas Piketty. It is the
translation of a first note in French (LIEPP’s discussion paper 25)
mostly addressing the issues raises in the French edition of the book
("Le Capital au XXIe siècle"). We would like to thank Alain Trannoy,
Cornelia Woll and Peter Rupert for their very useful suggestions and
comments.
Thomas Piketty. However, this does not mean that housing
prices do not contribute to other forms of inequality. When
housing prices rise, owners of the housing capital hold a
higher value that can be transformed into consumption.
It is also more difficult for young adults to become
homeowners. Housing incomes of owners however do not
necessarily increase which casts serious doubt on Piketty’s
conclusion of a potential explosive dynamics of inequality
based on these trends.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of capital has always led to the greatest
controversies. The most famous of which was
between the MIT neo-classical school and the neo-
Ricardians of Cambridge, England in the 1960s (see
box I). The debate was about possible inconsis-
tencies and tautologies in the measurement of the
capital stock and its earnings. Capital in the 21st
Century may be a new example of a similar contro-
versy. In this remarkable work, Piketty concluded
by stating that “capital is back in France” and in
several other countries around the world. This book
has been celebrated for the enormous amount of
work it entailed and for the clarity and importance
of its conclusions. One of these conclusions, the
most striking and perhaps the most salient, is the
emergence of a risk of a worldwide explosion in
inequality: “the process by which wealth is accu-
mulated and distributed contains powerful forces
pushing toward divergence, or at any rate, toward
an extremely high level of inequality”1. Divergence
1p. 27 Capital in the 21st Century.
2is a dynamic concept that arises from the process of
accumulating capital. Capital produces earnings and
returns and thus it accumulates and self-develops.
This thesis is made explicitly clear in the chapter
devoted to the neo-classical model “r − g”.
The first chapter describes the logic as follows.
First, the higher the capital/income ratio, the higher
the earnings of capital relative to labor2. Second, if
the rate of return on capital (r) is higher than the
growth rate of the economy (g), the capital/income
ratio will rise, eventually leading to a world where
a class of owners would have perpetually increas-
ing income from capital due to rising accumulated
wealth. The author documents the strong rise of
the capital/income ratio, especially in France, but
also provides evidence of a similar trend in other
countries. He suggests a worrisome accumulation
of wealth in just a few hands and a rise in inequality.
This theoretical analysis is the logical follow-up to
Solow and Samuelson’s neo-classical approaches.
Our work is intended to question the relevance
of the capital measurement used in the book and
to point out an inconsistency between the theory
- the model of infinite accumulation of capital
through rising earnings relative to national income
- and the choice to include housing capital in total
capital. Before developing our analysis, we should
highlight that, aside from housing capital, the capital
income ratio has dropped due to the disappearance
of agricultural rent in France. In the US, the net
capital income ratio of housing capital was the same
in 1770 as it was in 2010 and there is neither a long
run trend nor a recent increase of this ratio. See
figure 1.
2At constant rates of return. Note also that the measurement
of the share of labor in national accounts is in itself a source of
empirical debates due to necessary corrections for self-employment,
the government sector and, again, ... housing services. See Rupert
(2012) and Gomme and Rupert (2004) for an example of a correction
that changes the trends in labor shares.
(a) Capital in the United States, 1770-2010
(b) Capital in France, 1700-2010
Sources: Capital in the 21st Century, Figures 4.6 & Chart 3.2- see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
Figure 1. Secular decline in the capital/income ratio (excluding
housing) in France and secular stability in the US.
Housing is a very particular component of capital
and its interpretation has always been subject to
complex discussions, even within the neo-classical
world3. In particular, housing capital does not
provide a good measure of actual return on capital.
Housing is both a consumption good, the price of
which comes from rental or shelter costs, and an
investment good, yielding an income corresponding
3For instance, Buiter (2010), in a paper entitled Housing wealth
isn’t wealth, concludes that individual consumption is unchanged
if housing prices increase and if the price increase follows the
fundamentals (hence the exclusion of bubbles). If there is a housing
bubble, there are real effects on consumption due to distortions.
These effects are of a second order however and are very different
from those described in Thomas Piketty’s book (see below). Bajari,
Benkard, and Krainer (2005) concluded that there is no first order
impact on the price of existing housing stocks and the welfare of the
economy: welfare gains due to the gains of sellers are compensated
by welfare losses at the expenses of buyers. These transfers contribute
to inequality but do not imply any systematic divergence of wealth
since sales occur only once and even sellers need somewhere to live.
3to the rent. Only landlords (who represent a rel-
atively small fraction of the population) effectively
receive monetary income from their housing capital.
Owner-occupiers do not receive any income. How-
ever they do save on rent and receive an implicit
rent. Returns on housing capital (the key ingredient
in the “r” part of the “r − g” model) are therefore
more accurately measured by rent on housing, be it
monetary or only implicit.
The valuation of housing capital based on housing
prices is actually disconnected from the inequality-
generating process that the author wants to establish.
For the value of housing capital to be consistent with
the underlying theoretical analysis, the value must
correspond to an actualized value of rent and not
rely on housing prices. The two measures are only
equivalent in the absence of a divergence between
housing prices and rent. Precisely, this divergence
was observed in several countries, especially France,
since the late 1990’s. This may have arisen from a
bubble in housing prices, but this is not necessarily
the case, and the existence of a bubble is not
necessary for our argument. When fundamentals
(such as real interest rates or the specific utility
derived from property) do change, this may also
lead to higher prices relative to rent.
When we recalculate the value of housing capital
based on rent indices, the rise in the capital/income
ratio has been modest over the recent period. In the
longer run, we observe a decline in this ratio rather
than a U curve, contradicting the author’s thesis.
It is also worth noting that long term comparisons
of housing capital do not necessarily make sense:
currently, homeowners are the majority of house-
holds (56% in France, 70% in the UK). In 1950, this
proportion was respectively 37% and 30%4. This
is even further away from Karl Marx’s description
of 19th century England where, for 20 million
inhabitants, he only counted 36,000 homeowners.
It is therefore highly problematic to analyze the
dynamics of capital inequality without being very
specific about its distribution in the population.
4Source: Trannoy and Wasmer (2013).
Box 1. The Cambridge controversy (Cambridge Massachussets.
vs Cambridge, Angleterre) on capital measurement
Neo-classical theory by Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow (MIT,
Cambridge, Mass.) assumes there is equality between the return on
capital and its marginal productivity. The return on capital being the
product of the rate of return on capital and the stock of capital, the
measurement of capital is obtained by dividing the actual return
on capital and its return rate. Piero Sraffa and Joan Robinson
have challenged this view and have suggested a tautology in this
reasoning.
Neo-classical economists use the rate of return on capital to
measure the aggregate stock of capital: in order to calculate units
of capital of a different nature, such as machine-tools and rolling
stock or office space, one must first evaluate the stock of capital
based on its market monetary value. More precisely, this value
is based on the price of capital. If the rate of return on capital
is different across sectors due to the rent capture phenomena and
contrary to the central neo-classical assumption, then the return on
capital is not going to lead to an accurate value of the capital stock.
The value of the capital can therefore not be properly calculated.
Sraffa proposed instead to measure the value of capital with the
total number of hours needed to produce it. This allowed him to
rigorously compare the different units of capital with a common
ladder, units of labor.
Without arguing in favor of this measurement of capital based
on the hours needed to produce it, our work is inspired by this
reasoning that prefers to measure returns on capital based on
actual rents because they are precisely the source of the dynamics
of accumulation of capital, rather than by using housing prices
which have been over their long run value for more than a decade
(Trannoy and Wasmer, 2013).
The rest of the monograph is organized as fol-
lows. Section II discusses the right measure of
capital in particular housing capital. It provides
the measure of capital consistent with a model of
capital accumulation, and reaches clear conclusions
regarding capital stability in France which also
applies to the United Kingdom, the United States
and Canada. The capital/income ratio has only risen
in Germany over the last few decades. Section III
focusses on returns to housing capital and argue that
they must necessarily have declined. It show why
rising housing prices do not necessarily lead to a
rise in the income of homeowners or landlords and
accordingly why housing inflation does not trigger
a divergent accumulation of wealth by the richest
people.
However, we would like to make it very clear
that we do not deny that the rise in housing price
has had real consequences on access to housing
and inequality. It has had bona fide consequences
on the wealth trajectories of individuals and dy-
4nasties: in particular, it is increasingly difficult for
an individual without initial wealth to become a
homeowner in France. These consequences, which
are analyzed in greater detail in Sections IV and V,
are real. They are however very different from the
alleged explosive dynamics of wealth accumulation
and should not be considered first order.
II. THE VALUE OF HOUSING CAPITAL MUST BE
BASED ON RENTS, NOT ON HOUSING PRICES
The author defines and describes capital in several
countries over the long run and includes housing
capital as well as returns from agricultural lands as
capital (buildings, equipment, machinery, patents,
etc.) as well as net foreign capital.
A. In most countries, national accounts value hous-
ing capital on housing prices
The data used in Capital in the 21st Century
are based on national accounts. The method is
typically applied as follows: housing capital is the
sum of buildings and land with constructs. For
instance, in France, housing capital is estimated
through a first step of estimating the total stock
and value of housing in a reference year (1998) by
INSEE, the French Institute of Statistics. INSEE
then follows over time the evolution of the number
of buildings from aggregate housing investments,
deflated by the housing construction index; and the
evolution of land with constructs using the evolution
of the surface area covered by housing units and the
development of the surface area covered by houses.
To get the year-by-year value of housing capital
stock, the above-described volume is multiplied by
the price index of existing housing. Furthermore,
new buildings were also evaluated at the price
of existing housing units. Hence, housing capital
follows year-to-year evolutions of housing prices,
by contruction.
Though this method of calculation makes sense
for national accounting, it does not lead to any
implication regarding the dynamic accumulation of
capital. As discussed in the introduction section,
housing capital produces a real return for landlords,
from rent. It also produces an implicit return as rent
“saved” by the owner-occupiers. On both accounts,
the value of real estate capital must be based on rent
and not on the evolution of housing prices.
Sources: Friggit, http://www.cgedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/prix- immobilier-evolution-1200-
a1048.html. “Compte du logement 2013”. On the graph, we compare the changes of real estate
prices, of average rents and indices. Average values take into account trends in the quality of housing,
while indices do not correct for quality changes.
Figure 2. Evolution of housing prices and rental prices in France
since 1984
B. The difference matters in France: housing prices
rose and rent indices remained quite stable
The most remarkable fact about the housing
market over the last decade is that there was a
60% rise in the ratio of housing prices relative to
the disposable income of households. This large
increase is all the more striking because it was
not accompanied by a rise in rents during that
period, which remained stable relative to income
over the same period (see figure 2). We will not
try to explain why housing prices went up quickly
here, but rather we will attempt to understand the
consequences this has on income and savings for
homeowners and households in the rental sector
The value of housing capital must be corrected:
we did this by multiplying the initial housing capital
by the the rent-to-price ratio. Doing so, the recent
trend in housing capital is replaced with a very
modest evolution (figure 3)5.
5Note that the strong increase over the last period in Thomas
Piketty’s book is in part an artifact: the very last observation is for
one year only (2010), as compared to earlier observations which are
evolutions over decades. This single observation which we left on the
figure to compare to the source should be placed on the horizontal
scale is closer than previous period (2000-2009) by half compared to
the typical 10 years intervals of other observations. This changes the
apparent rise of the capital/income ratio, which may actually further
be limited by a decline in the series which appears after 2011.
5Sources: National accounts (decenial average), data from Thomas Piketty (figure 3.2 - see
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c) after correcting the value of capital (authors’ calculations).
Housing capital is deflated from the housing price index and multiplied by the index of rental prices.
Indices are chosen to represent 1 in 1998, which corresponds to a ’neutral year’, this is where indexes
of price and rents relative to income are in their long term average or "regularity area" (Friggit, 2014):
in 1998, the rent-to-price ratio is close to its long-run average and we assume that prices are then
proportional to rents, as a present discounted value of these rents. The choice of a base year different
than 1998 would vary the level of the corrected capital/labor ratio, but would not affect the relative
evolutions after correction. The last year in this figure and next figures is 2010, but it should not be
compared to other periods in this graph for the reasons given in footnote 5.
Figure 3. Capital in France with housing capital correctly measured,
based on rent series
C. The difference also matters in most countries:
capital/income ratios remained stable or increased
considerably less than before correction of capital,
except in Germany
The correction method is applied to other coun-
tries where prices and rent data are available. For
these countries, we used series of the price over rent
ratio, available for the US, the UK, Canada and
Germany, as displayed in figure 10 in Appendix.
Note that we do not take a stance here on whether
there is a bubble in any on these countries, France
included. Our argument is simply that if rent and
housing price diverge, the value of capital should
be measured from rent indices.
This is what we do next: we recalculate hous-
ing capital and obtain capital/income ratios which
better measures the evolution of returns on capital.
Aside from Germany, where this ratio appears to
be lower than in other countries (Germans do not
own as frequently as in other countries), the ratio
of capital over income has remained stable in the
other countries. Germany is an interesting case
where real estate prices have generally declined over
the period relative to rents which has raised the
corrected capital income ratio. Germany is reputed
to be a country where social cohesion is high and
where income inequality is regarded as low yet its
capital over income ratio rose. Does this mean that
Sources: National accounts (decenial average), Thomas Piketty’s database (figure 4.10 of the French
edition of the book- See http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c) modified after the correction discussed
in the text. Here, housing capital is calculated based on rents. The value of housing capital is deflated
from a price index of real estate and then multiplied by an index of rents (index = 1 in 2010) from
OECD data. The choice of a base year different from 2010 would not affect the relative evolutions
after correction.
Figure 4. Capital in the United States with a corrected measure of
housing capital based on rental price of housing
Sources: National accounts (decenial average), Thomas Piketty’s database (figure 4.9 of the French
edition of the book- See http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c) modified after the correction discussed
in the text. Here, housing capital is calculated based on rents. The value of housing capital is deflated
from a price index of real estate and then multiplied by an index of rents (index = 1 in 2010) from
OECD data. The choice of a base year different from 2010 would not affect the relative evolutions
after correction.
Figure 5. Capital in Canada with a corrected measure of housing
capital based on the rental price of housing
in this country, an explosion of wealth inequality
is on its way? The answer is no, as we will point
out below: the capital income ratio is in itself not a
very precise measure of wealth inequality, because it
ignores the distribution of capital in the population.
6Sources: National accounts (decenial average), Thomas Piketty’s database (figure 3.1 of the French
edition of the book- See http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c) modified after the correction discussed
in the text.Here, housing capital is calculated based on rents. The value of housing capital is deflated
from a price index of real estate and then multiplied by an index of rents (index = 1 in 2010) from
OECD data. The choice of a base year different from 2010 would not affect the relative evolutions
after correction.
Figure 6. Capital in the United Kingdom with a corrected measure
of housing capital based on rental price of housing
Sources: National accounts (decenial average), Thomas Piketty’s database (figure 4.1 of the French
edition of the book- See http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c) modified after the correction discussed
in the text. Here, housing capital is calculated based on rents. The value of housing capital is deflated
from a price index of real estate and then multiplied by an index of rents (index = 1 in 2010) from
OECD data. The choice of a base year different from 2010 would not affect the relative evolutions
after correction.
Figure 7. Capital in Germany with a corrected measure of housing
capital based on rental price of housing
III. THE RISE OF HOUSING CAPITAL DOES NOT
IMPLY A RISE IN THE RETURNS IN CAPITAL:
QUITE THE CONTRARY
A. As a matter of fact, the share of capital in total
income has stagnated since 1948 in France, and has
declined since 1900
One way to rephrase what has been argued so
far is to make a distinction between the value of
housing capital at the current housing price and
its return as a percentage, which is precisely the
value of rent divided by the price. If the latter
has increased quickly due to the rise of housing
prices, the former must necessarily decrease with
constant rent and the total return (the product of the
two quantities) will show an ambiguous trend either
positively or negatively.
This is important to understanding the logic of
this note. In Capital in the 21st Century, the
author insists on the strong positive trend of the
capital/income ratio over the last three decades in
France as seen from figure 1 where we also con-
sidered housing capital represented with the dashed
line. The author cites the “first fundamental law
of capitalism”: if the return to capital is r, and the
share of income to capital in total income is β, then:
α = r × β.
The rise in β could lead us to think that the share of
capital in total income must have increased as well.
This is not the case however as can be seen in figure
86, which shows the contrary, a secular decline in
returns to capital in France (upper curve), a secular
decline of the returns to other capital and a moderate
increase in net rents in national income since 1948,
mostly a return to the values at the beginning of the
20th century which compensates for the decline of
the returns to physical capital (not housing)7.
The value of housing capital (β) estimated at
the price of housing is therefore not necessarily
correlated with the share of income it generates
in national income (α). In fact, if β has rapidly
progressed in several countries over the last decades,
α has only progressed slowly in the most extreme
cases, or remained stable as in France, or even
decreased as in Japan8. As a matter of fact, a
good measure of the returns to housing capital if
taxation was constant would be given by the rent-
to-price ratio of Appendix figure 10, which, except
6Note that the implicit income of homeowners (56% of the
population) is estimated based on rental and shelter costs of tenants
in the private rental sector (20%) and does not take into account
residents in the social housing sector (17%). Their rents are clearly
lower than those in the private sector and the implicit income of
homeowners is most likely already over evaluated.
7Also note that returns to capital series for France used in Capital
in the 21st Century are based on rents estimated from the 2002 French
Enquête Logement, which has been known to artificially overestimate
the level of rent over the recent period. A correction in the 2006
Enquête Logement led to a downward reevaluation of this increase
in the share of rents in national revenue over the last period. Figure
8 uses the rent data corrected for this revision of national accounts.
We thank Jacques Friggit for enlightening us on this point.
8http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/pdf/supp/TS6.3.pdf
7Sources: INSEE and Piketty (http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c).
Note: The upper series is the addition of implicit and monetary rents (lowest series) and non housing
capital income (intermediate series). From the 1990s, we can see a decrease in capital income which
is compensated by a rise in the amount of rents.
Figure 8. Decomposition of the share of capital income in French
national income
for Germany, declined in all countries.
B. Housing prices are therefore disconnected from
the share of income from housing in national income
This apparent paradox is relatively simple to un-
derstand. The rise in ratio β is only a consequence
of housing capital. Yet, the share of capital income
in total income depends on the returns to different
assets. In the following equation:
αtotal = αother capital + αhousing capital
= rother capital ×
other capital
income
+ rhousing capital ×
housing capital
income
More precisely, we define the value of housing
capital over income as the product of its price per
unit of housing - taking into account quality - and
the volume - in quality units - of the housing stock
represented by a function F not made more explicit
here :
housing capital
income
=
Housing price × F (quantity; quality)
income
while
rhousing capital =
value of rents
Housing price
Combined, we obtain:
rhousing capital ×
housing capital
income
=
value of rents
Housing price
× Housing price× F (quantity; quality)
income
(1)
The housing price therefore cancels out in equa-
tion (1). In a purely accounting sense, a rise in
housing prices has no direct impact on the share
of capital income in total incomes. This share
depends only on rent and on the quantity and
quality of housing. If the housing capital relative
to income follows housing prices, the share of its
revenues in total income follows rent indices. More
precisely, since prices and rents have diverged, it is
unsurprising that β (evaluated at the housing price
as in Piketty) has increased while α (based on rents)
remained stable.
This leaves us with with one item to discuss: the
rise in housing price leads to capital gains which
were ignored in the previous analysis. Most capital
gains are used by sellers, not to consume more, but
to buy a new dwelling. For homeowners increasing
the size of their house, the rise in prices leads
to a decline in well-being, despite larger capital
gains from selling their old house. The analysis
given in the following section clarifies this issue by
investigating the various redistributive effects of a
housing price increase and the distribution of capital
gains in the population.
IV. HOW DO RENTS AND REAL ESTATE PRICES
AFFECT INEQUALITY?
The increase in housing prices affects the distri-
bution of wealth in the population. The following
explanation details these consequences. However,
we would like to emphasize that they have noth-
ing to do with the conclusion reached by Thomas
Piketty and that this increase will not create an
explosive increase in the dynamics of inequality.
A. Four profiles: tenants, first time owners, owner-
occupiers and landlords
Let’s consider four different profiles:
8• A tenant, who pays a rent L,
• An owner-occupier, who owns his main resi-
dence and who has already repaid his loan or
who did not take out a loan9,
• A first time owner, who pays an amount I
within the period given to repay his loan,
• A landlord who owns two housing goods (peo-
ple who occupy one and rent the other for an
amount L).
In order to investigate the impact of housing price
increases on the different profiles, we assumed that
their other characteristics were the same. At the
beginning of the period therefore, they all have the
same amount of financial capital K, which yields
rK for each period, where r is the return on capital.
They also earn the same wage w and pay taxes
T . Tenants pay a rent L. The value of housing
is equal to H0 at the beginning of the period and to
H1 = H0(1 + gH) at the end, where gH stands for
the growth rate of housing prices. Homeowners also
pay maintenance costs and property taxes that we
considered, for simplicity’s sake, to be proportional
to the initial value H0 with a proportional coefficient
of a. How does this affect our profiles at the end of
the period? They will consume a quantity C, possi-
bly different for each group, and save the difference
between their incomes and their expenses. At the
end of the period, the tenant will have a financial
capital yten of:
yten = (w − T − C − L) +K(1 + r) (2)
and no housing capital.
The owner-occupier will have a financial capital
yown−occ of
yown−occ = (w − T − C − aH0) +K(1 + r) (3)
and a housing capital H1.
The first time owner will have a financial capital
yfirst−time−own of :
yfirst−time−own = (w−T −C−I−aH0)+K(1+r)
(4)
and a housing capital H1.
9This category of owner-occupiers also includes households who
have sold their dwelling and who have used the capital gain to
purchase another residence without taking out a loan.
The landlord will have a financial capital ylandlord
de :
ylandlord = (w−T −C+L−aH0)+K(1+ r) (5)
and a housing capital 2H1.
We found that the difference in financial capi-
tal between these categories does not depend on
housing price, but on rent, which has a negative
impact on tenants, a positive impact on landlords
and no impact at all on first time owners or on
owner-occupiers. Our first lesson is that, for a
given consumption, homeowners only save rent (and
maintenance costs) relative to tenants, regardless of
housing prices. The increase in house prices has no
impact on disposable income.
In other words, it is not because our house cost
100, 000 dollars when we bought it and that it is now
worth 500, 000 dollars that we are able to consume
more or save more money. As long as we live in
our house, our disposable income remains the same.
In contrast, the housing capital of owners will
have risen. Let us suppose from now on, that
there exists a second period where owners could
sell their housing goods in order to increase their
consumption.
B. The impact of a housing price increase on the
different profiles
The price increase impacts various agents de-
pending on their occupation status during the in-
crease. By detailing these effects, we find the
following typology:
• For first time owners and owner-occupiers who
sell their house and become tenants, the in-
crease in housing price enables them to in-
crease their consumption and fosters a rise in
inequality. However, becoming a tenant after
being an owner is rare (as discussed in Section
V)
• For first time owners and owner-occupiers who
are buying another housing unit, either their
consumption of housing goods decreases and
their consumption of other goods increase, or
their consumption of housing and non-housing
goods remains stable. The increase in housing
prices has no impact on inequality here
• Landlords benefit from a house price increase
only if they sell one of their goods
9• Tenants who would like to become owners face
higher interest payments. This should reduce
their consumption and increase inequality for
owners. However, this statement should be
qualified. The increased loan cost is mitigated
if interest rates decrease, or to a lesser extent,
if the loan’s maturity is lengthened (because it
allows households to reallocate consumption to
the first years of their loan thereby increasing
their well-being). It happens that both of these
trends have been observed over the last few
decades in France. Therefore, the reasoning
above only applies to the share of the increase
in housing price which is neither due to the
decrease in interest rates nor due to an increase
in maturities. These two trends contribute
to the increase in price according to Friggit
(2011).
C. A limited impact which does not create explosive
dynamics of inequality
The impact of an increase in housing prices
seems to be very limited. Only landlords who
sell their goods would increase their consumption.
The other owners, if they sell, will have to find
new accommodations and therefore, also face the
increased housing price. The “real” housing price,
that is the price of purchase deflated by the price
of repurchasing an equivalent good, is simply equal
to 1. This real price is however not 1 for people
willing to accept becoming a tenant, and therefore
who can afford increased consumption. Similarly,
tenants who wish to buy a house will instead suffer
from the housing price increase, but only for a share
of this increase.
The increase in housing prices is therefore not
neutral. It also creates life cycle effects: there is
a transfer of wealth from households who become
owners to former owners or to people who have
inherited from prior owners10. In contrast, the rise in
housing prices is neutral in terms of inequality if we
consider dynasties that transfer across generations
the housing goods they occupy or those who sell
them to occupy another one. If a young successor
inherits an amount of money coming from the sale
of a housing good and buys another housing good
10Rents and Housing prices: CGEDD (Notaires-
Insee, Friggit 2007 ; http://www.cgedd.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=1).
by means of this legacy, it is the same as if prices
had not increased. Here again, the real price of
housing is 1 if we think in terms of dynasties. Only
when a dynasty transfers housing capital which is
sold in order to buy financial capital, the increase in
housing prices enables an increase in consumption
for the next generation. However, this housing
price increase only has an impact once, at the time
of the sale. The housing price increase creates a
store of value for owners. As we will show in
section V, this type of legacy will not be used
to increase consumption, because they will most
likely not be selling their housing good (or if they
do, they will probably buy a new one). However,
these savings will be useful for their children or
for themselves if they should run out of money.
The increase in housing prices creates an insurance
against social risks for owners: in case of money
problems, it is possible to sell the property and
become a tenant. This mechanism is very different
from an explosive dynamics; the “store of value”
argument does not create a dynamic process of
inequality accumulation.
To sum up this section, the increase in housing
prices creates a transfer from new owners to older
owners or to the next generation, but as previously
stated, these effects are of a second order (redis-
tributive effects) and they are mitigated (cf. infra).
Unlike what was suggested in Capital in the 21st
Century, the increase in housing prices does not
lead to first order effects, that is to say an explosive
dynamic of inequality that would benefit households
with significant housing capital, except for a small
share of landlords at the beginning of the increase
who chose to sell their good at the end of the
increase.
V. THE HOUSING CAPITAL OF FRENCH
HOUSEHOLDS
A. When there are more homeowners, the housing
capital is more evenly distributed
Whatever the value of the capital/income ratio,
the dynamics of inequality over the last 200 years
seems hard to understand without first looking at the
distribution of capital among the population. This
is particularly important since the manner in which
capital is distributed has a direct impact on the dis-
tribution of income. As a consequence, even when
the value of the housing capital is calculated from
10
rent and not from housing prices, any conclusion in
terms of inequalities is hard to infer.
There has been a dramatic change in the distri-
bution of housing capital among households over
the last century. For example, Marx and Engels
described the British housing market in the 19th
century as follows:
“The census for England and Wales in 1861
gives the total population as 20,066,224 and the
number of house owners as 36,032, the proportion
of the owners to the number of houses and to the
population would take on a very different aspect, if
the great house owners were placed on one side and
the small ones on the other.” (The capital – Volume
III – Chapter 37)
This type of situation, where a small share of
the population owns most of the housing capital,
appears to be far from the current situation of
developed countries where the homeownership rate
varies between 40% and 70%. The diffusion of
homeownership is likely to slow or even reverse
the rise of inequality regardless of trends in housing
prices.
As the French example illustrates, homeowner-
ship rates have dramatically increased since the
1950s (Fig 9). Currently, approximately 56% of
households own their house, 20% rent in the for-
profit sector and 17% benefit from publicly sub-
sidized social housing. It is worth noting that
an increase in rent levels in the for-profit sector
would only change the situation of tenants of the
private sector and their landlords with respect to
the other households (20% of the housing capital).
The existence of a significant social housing sector
(1/5 the housing stock) would therefore mitigate
the distributive impact of such a phenomenon. The
income generated by housing capital is less likely to
increase inequality than it was in the beginning of
the 19th century since the diffusion of homeowner-
ship has contributed to more evenly spread housing
capital.
Sources: Rates from 1955 (38 %) to 2006 (55.9 %) were calculated by Jacques Friggit from the French
Housing Survey. They were harmonized to fit the 2002definition of homeownership (Friggit, 2010). The
1950 data point came from Cahen (1957).
Figure 9. Evolution of the homeownership rate in France between
1950
Distritribution of homeowners per level of income
Year 1st decile
low
middle
class
high
middle
class
highest
decile
total
1984 7 36 45 11 100
2006 4 33 51 12 100
Sources: 1984 and 2006 Enquêtes Logement de l’INSEE
Note: The 10% poorest represented 7% of the homeowners in 1984 and 4% in 2006.
Table I
DISTRIBUTION OF HOMEOWNERS ACCORDING TO INCOME
B. Residential trajectories in the life cycle: home
sweet home
As suggested in section 2, the accumulation of
housing capital due to a change in price does not
generate additional income until the capital is sold.
Though it seems rational for seniors to sell their
house, few households do so. Several empirical
studies have shown that the elderly tend to remain
homeowners both in France and in the US. The
homeownership rate increases steadily with the age
of the reference person in the household, reaching
its peak between the ages of 65 and 74 with the
rate decreasing marginally afterwards. These figures
suggest that only a small share of homeowners
sell their home as they age. The reason for these
transactions are more related to unexpected events
(death of a spouse, health condition, etc.) than
11
Country 55-64 yrs 65-74 yrs 75-84 yrs
Germany (2007) 55.97 50.91 47.55
United State (2007) 80.69 82.12 79.72
Canada (2004) 78.03 76.65 67.94
Spain 90.01 89.12 86.26
Australia (2003) 81.42 81.82 82.31
Luxembourg (2004) 77,20 84,21 81,6
France (2006) 70.32 73.50 71.07
Sources : Andrews and Sánchez (2011) and 2006 French Enquête logement
TABLE II
SHARE OF HOMEOWNERS BY AGE GROUP (%)
for economic reasons. Chiuri and Jappelli (2010)
who further suggested that the generation effect
could lead us to underestimate homeownership rates
amongst the elderly whereas a lower mortality rate
among homeowners could lead us to underestimate
it.
These findings are similar to those of several
studies conducted in the United States.11Several
hypotheses could explain this phenomenon. Access
to homeownership is usually considered an achieve-
ment and returning to the rental sector could be
considered a drop in status. Additionally, seniors
can be attached to their homes as well as their direct
environments. They may also consider their home
as a reserve of value or a legacy for their children.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our text has alluded to the fact that housing
as measured in national account could in part an
illusion as housing prices may return to lower
values. To better see this point, let us ask two
questions. First, what inequality would there be
if each household owned one painting and kept it
throughout its lifetime? The wealthiest households
might own a pricey Manet or Kandinsky. The
11Venti and Wise (1990) highlighted the fact that aged homeowners
didn’t sell their house to take advantage of the capital gain due to
the price increase during the 1970s. Even if some dissensions exist
among scholars, most of them recognize that retired households don’t
decrease their housing wealth when ageing. For example, Skinner
(1996) showed that, when moving, retired households were as likely
to increase their housing wealth (buying a more expansive home) as
to decrease it (buying a smaller house or renting).
poorest might own a painting by a local artist.
Now, if the price of art increased uniformly, would
this contribute to an explosion of inequality in the
sense of a divergent and exponential accumulation
of capital? The answer is clearly it would not. Even
if the paintings could be rented and generate some
income for the owners, this revenue would need to
increase proportionally to the selling price and faster
than the labor earnings for capital to increase faster
than total income.
Second, in the same line of thought, do we really
believe that a drop in the price of housing (as
occurred in Spain and Ireland) would be excellent
news, leading to a compression of wealth inequal-
ity? Again, the answer is clearly not. These two
questions show the fragility of this line of reasoning
that is exclusively based on a rise in the value of
housing capital due to the rise in its purchase price,
especially when this price diverges from the rental
price - as was the case in France and other countries
over the past 15 years.
Our analysis led us to conclude (more optimisti-
cally, or perhaps just less pessimistically) that long-
run trends in wealth inequality are not dramatic. In
the United States, the stock of capital has decreased
relative to total income over the last century and
has remained stable since the 1970s. Additionally,
income inequality has increased but it is due to
a more unequal distribution of wages and rising
returns of human capital. This dramatic rise in
inequality in the US has little to do with capital.
As discussed in Paul Krugman’s review12, it is hard
to explain the evolution of the top 1% earnings with
a story based on physical capital accumulation. In
continental Europe, income inequality has decreased
or been contained.
The capital/income ratio has therefore increased
only because of the choice made to measure the
value of capital as indexed on the housing price and
not indexed on rental price. A shallow reading of
Thomas Piketty’s book could lead us to believe in
an explosion of inequality but this dramatic trend in
wealth inequality is not in the data. Our work shows
12“For the fact is that the most conspicuous example of
soaring inequality in today’s world—the rise of the very
rich one percent in the Anglo-Saxon world, especially the
United States—doesn’t have all that much to do with capital
accumulation, at least so far. It has more to do with remarkably
high compensation and incomes.”, New York Review of Books,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/thomas-
piketty-new-gilded-age/
12
that this is not confirmed by the analysis. This is
by no means a denial of the considerable interest of
the data collection and the interest of the historical
perspective it brings.
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APPENDIX
A. Rent to price ratios in various OECD countries
Sources: OECD. Economic Outlook Database and Main Indicators database.
Figure 10. Rent-to-price ratios in various OECD countries
